

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.486
11 August 1970
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SIXTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 11 August 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

(Czechoslovakia)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols
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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:

Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
Mr. A.F. DUMONT
Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI

Brazil:

Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO
Mr. D.F. NATARIO
Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA

Bulgaria:

Mr. T. PETROV
Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV

Burma:

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
Mr. R.W. CLARK
Mr. D.W. CAMPBELL
Mr. R.E. MOORE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. F. MARESKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. G. ALEMU

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. J. PETRAN
Mr. I. SARKADI
Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCILO
Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
Mr. R. BORSARELLI
Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:

Mr. H. TANAKA
Mr. H. OTSUKA
Mr. T. FENGOKU
Mr. J. SAKAMOTO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. M. TELLO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. Z. ERENDO
Mrs. D. BALJINNYAM

Morocco:

Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI
Mr. T. KABBAJ

Netherlands:

Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
Mr. E. BOS

Nigeria:

Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
Mr. L.A. MALIKI

Pakistan:

Mr. S.A.D. BUKHARI

Poland:

Mr. W. NATORF
Mr. K. ZYBILSKI
Mr. H. STEPOSZ

Romania:

Mr. C. MITRAN
Mr. N. CHILIE

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV
Mr. Y.C. NAZARKINE

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF

Mr. O. SIRRY

United Kingdom:

Mr. I.F. PORTER

Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY

Mr. J.T. MASEFIELD

United States of America:

Mr. J.F. LEONARD

Mr. A.F. NEIDLE

Mr. J. ASDENBERG

Mr. W. GIVAN

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. BOZINOVIC

Mr. M. VUKOVIC

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): I declare open the 486th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
2. I should like to draw attention to the documents which members of the Committee now have before them: a working paper presented by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons (CCD/303); a working paper presented by Italy entitled "Additional Working Paper on the Problem of Controls over Chemical Weapons" (CCD/304); a letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitting General Assembly document A/7967/Add.4 (CCD/284/Add.3); and a working paper presented by Canada on seismological capabilities in detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions (CCD/305).
3. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): I should like briefly to explain how the Canadian working paper (CCD/305) relates to papers that delegations have already received on the subject of seismological capabilities, and what we propose to do tomorrow at the informal meeting.
4. Members of the Committee will remember that in my statement of 25 June (CCD/PV.473, paras. 24 et seq.) I referred to the need for a special report under the terms of resolution 2604 B (XXIV) of the last session of the United Nations General Assembly (CCD/275) with respect to a comprehensive test ban. Canada sponsored the draft resolution which subsequently became resolution 2604 B (XXIV), as well as that which subsequently became resolution 2604 A (XXIV), requesting the Secretary-General to circulate a questionnaire concerning the international availability of seismic data.
5. On 4 August we distributed to each delegation a technological document prepared by Mr. Whitham and Mr. Basham, containing an assessment of world-wide seismological capabilities of detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions, based on the information submitted in response to the questionnaire. We distributed the assessment at that time in order to permit delegations to review the information it contained prior to the informal meeting scheduled for tomorrow. I should explain today that we have not followed the usual sequence of a meal. First, we gave the main entrée, a copy to each delegation; today we are presenting what might be described as the dessert; and tomorrow we shall be concerned with the hors d'oeuvres and the fish course. I thought that a word of explanation might help to prevent some confusion. The material is all basically the same.

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

6. Today members of the Committee have before them, therefore, the Canadian working paper on seismological capabilities in detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions, to which you have referred, Mr. Chairman. The working paper summarizes some of the conclusions reached in the Canadian assessment and reiterates a series of questions which I suggested in my statement on 25 June (CCD/PV.473, paras. 31-38) might usefully be examined in preparation for the informal meeting to be held tomorrow.

7. Mr. BOZINOVIC (Yugoslavia): I should like to introduce today the working paper, already distributed to delegations, on the elements for a system of control of the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons (CCD/302).

8. On 16 April my delegation elaborated to some extent, as members of the Committee will recall, on some of the aspects of the problem of control or verification of a possible complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons (CCD/PV.456, para. 36). Since the discussion so far has shown that a great number of States consider the question of control or verification as one of the basic issues instrumental to the solution of the problem of chemical and biological weapons, and since we are engaged in a matter of real disarmament, we have endeavoured, like many other delegations, to go somewhat deeper into the aspect of control, believing that by facilitating the solution of that part of the problem one would facilitate the solution of the entire problem.

9. My delegation has also thought it useful, therefore, to present its suggestions in the form of a working paper. Our pretensions in this connexion do not go beyond the intention to indicate tentatively the possibility of setting up a system of measures which, in their final results and by supplementing one another, would render possible the introduction of functional control over the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, thus leading to the early conclusion of a treaty on the complete ban of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and biological agents for weapons purposes as well as chemical and biological weapons, and on their elimination from existing arsenals. In our working paper we have tried primarily to improve the systemization and also to present its elements more clearly, keeping in mind all the time the necessity to maintain maximum flexibility.

10. After those few introductory remarks I should like to offer additional clarification concerning some aspects of the working paper. In the first place, I should like to point out again that what we have in mind is a system of measures -- that

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is, several measures which, supplementing one another, would yield satisfactory results in the end. It is our view that it would be inappropriate and purposeless to try to single out each of these elements and attempt to prove its inadequacy for the purpose of control.

11. In the working paper we have indicated several requirements which control should meet in order to be purposeful and at the same time politically acceptable. We said at an earlier meeting that it was obvious that foolproof control was not possible and also that such control was not indispensable for our objective (CCD/PV.465, para. 34). Consequently, effectiveness should be sought solely within the limits of our needs. Seeking absolutely effective control might render our task impossible. We have always treated control as a function of disarmament and not as a category in itself.

12. As to national legislative measures, we wish to stress particularly that in our view they represent the basic deterrent to the violation of obligations under a treaty on the complete ban of chemical and biological weapons. There is no justification for the suspicion that after the enactment of a series of legislative measures on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons in a country there might arise a major illegal activity, such as production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons, elaboration of a military doctrine for their use, preparation of means for their delivery, training of troops to use them, and so forth. In other words, it would be very difficult to imagine that, alongside the laws which would completely prohibit chemical and biological weapons in a country, there could exist another set of parallel laws or regulations rendering possible whatever had been prohibited in this field by those laws.

13. The other group of measures are those of international control. It is quite evident that they are not intrusive, their aim being to help to provide sufficient assurance to all States that no activities prohibited by the treaty are being engaged in.

14. A further point is the question of an international organ. The task of that organ would be the collection of appropriate data on the basis of which one could have indications whether or not a country was violating a treaty on the complete ban of chemical and biological weapons. At the request of States such an organ could also carry out preliminary investigations in order to ascertain whether a violation of the treaty had occurred. In our working paper we have tried to present as few details as

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possible regarding that organ because we consider it essential at this stage to explore the idea and roughly describe the role and function of such an organ, in the belief that details could come later, gradually; once agreement on the necessity of such an organ had been reached, those details could be easily elaborated.

15. As to the detailed list of agents which should be subject to prohibition as well as the data to be published and reported by the parties to the treaty -- matters which are not elaborated in our working paper -- we should like to pay a tribute to the Swedish delegation for its contribution in submitting the tentative list of agents which it prepared for the informal meeting on chemical and biological weapons on 22 April and further elaborated at the informal meeting on 5 August, and to the Canadian delegation for its working paper (CCD/300) in which many questions are put forward that could contribute to a further elaboration of the issues of this nature. Also there is now a working paper submitted by the Japanese delegation (CCD/301) which contributes to the further clarification of this aspect by suggesting how the scope of agents to be reported on could be limited, and giving a concrete list.

16. We believe that all the contributions already made in connexion with this issue show that such lists could be drawn up; and we believe that they could later be changed or supplemented in accordance with the development of modern science and technology and that that could be done by the very international organ mentioned in our working paper.

17. Another point I should like to make in this explanation deals with the question of preliminary investigation. When we suggest making use of that procedure we are not in the least losing sight of the Security Council and its role. What we wish to achieve primarily by such a procedure is to avoid creating a political problem before exhausting other possibilities which, by their political nature, might be easier to achieve and at the same time could meet the objective set. I should like here to draw attention to the detailed view concerning this issue and to the contribution made by the Swedish delegation in the statement of the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, on 9 April (CCD/PV.463, paras. 20-21), from which we have greatly profited.

18. In conclusion, I wish to express the hope that the joint, concerted efforts made by this Committee and the General Assembly will in the year to come facilitate the work of our Committee in taking a decisive step towards the complete solution of the problem of chemical and biological weapons.

19. Mr. ROSECHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The Soviet delegation intends today to present some considerations concerning the problem of general and complete disarmament.

20. Speaking at the beginning of this year in favour of the renewal in the Committee of the discussion of that problem (CCD/PV.449, paras.55-59), we had in mind that such a discussion might help to find the most rational and mutually acceptable ways of approaching the preparation of, and agreement on, a programme of general and complete disarmament. We note with satisfaction that the problem of general and complete disarmament has been referred to by all members of the Committee in their statements during the spring and summer session and that in the course of the discussion concrete considerations have been advanced and suggestions made which deserve detailed study and analysis. In our statement today we intend to comment on some of the matters which have been touched upon in the course of the discussion.

21. The Soviet Union has always been in favour of the elaboration of a disarmament programme. In the past we submitted a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1). It was based on a number of principles which in our opinion have lost none of their significance. We are referring to the 1961 Joint Statement by the Soviet Union and the United States of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5), which was approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its sixteenth session (resolution 1660 (XVI)) and which recommended our Committee to base its discussion on general and complete disarmament upon those principles. We share the view of delegations which believe that the disarmament programme must be realistic and flexible, and that it must be based on the aims and principles previously defined and on the results which have so far been achieved by our efforts in the field of disarmament. We also agree with the view of the representative of Yugoslavia that the preparation of such a programme

"... should not degenerate into an end in itself, nor should the debate on the programme be permitted to drag on ad infinitum or to overshadow efforts dealing with individual urgent issues in this field". (CCD/PV.478, para.78)

22. At the same time, the Soviet delegation believes that the disarmament programme should not be linked chronologically to any "decade" or even two decades. It would hardly be very appropriate to fix a timetable for reaching agreement. Our task is to achieve the earliest possible agreement on, and implementation of, measures in the field of disarmament, especially as many of them do not allow of postponement and call for urgent decision. It must also be borne in mind that, as Mr. Khallaf, the representative

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of the United Arab Republic, said -- and we agree with him -- the criteria for establishing a programme for disarmament must be the practical possibilities, the maturity of the various questions, and of course, the international climate (CCD/PV.452, para.39).

23. As regards this last point -- namely, the linking of the problem of disarmament with that of international security -- which has received considerable attention in the statements of many delegations, we would say that in our view this interrelationship constitutes an important element, which must always be kept within our field of vision. The two problems interact constantly. It is an unquestionably correct thesis that a deterioration in the international climate contributes to the arms race and that the arms race, in turn, exacerbates relations between States, creates an atmosphere of mistrust and leads the world to the brink of war's catastrophe. Progress in disarmament is not an isolated process; it is connected with the problems of peace and security, the settlement of disputes and the establishment of an atmosphere of confidence. It is this interrelationship which explains why efforts to strengthen international security and achieve disarmament constantly engage the attention of all peoples.

24. Basing themselves on the fact that the problems of security and disarmament are closely connected, some delegations in the Committee have expressed the view that no progress can be made on one of these problems if the other is not solved concurrently. It seems to us that such an approach to the solution of these problems, and especially of the problem of disarmament, might result in further and sometimes unjustified delays and complications. Of course, it would be very tempting to work out procedures for solving both of these problems simultaneously, but that seems hardly feasible. The search for such procedures to solve these important international problems might create a situation in which the solution of urgent questions in the field of disarmament would be put off until progress had been made on ensuring international security. Such an approach would result in the Committee's having either to concern itself with the elaboration of subject-matter outside its competence or to hold up agreement on disarmament measures pending the favourable development of international events and positive results from the work of international bodies seeking ways of ensuring peace and international security. In our opinion, such an approach to the solution of the disarmament problem would not contribute to the attainment of those positive results.

25. In this connexion we should like to say that we do not share the view expressed by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, that:

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"... we should from now on specifically seek to introduce in a comprehensive programme for disarmament [and I stress "to introduce in a comprehensive programme for disarmament"] direct correlation with other United Nations activities. Pari passu with disarmament, a strengthening must take place of the United Nations machinery for establishing friendly relations; for settling disputes; for keeping a watch on conflicts brewing ...".

(CCD/PV.478, para.30)

There can, of course, be no doubt about the task of strengthening the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security. However, it would hardly be appropriate to tie directly together, in a single package, the attainment of a disarmament programme and an extensive range of measures of a different kind enumerated in the statement of the Swedish delegation. By acting in that way we would further complicate the already difficult negotiations on disarmament. We should, rather, try and achieve the greatest possible amount of progress in our talks seeking agreement on measures in the field of disarmament, with a view to the fact that success in these talks would contribute to ensuring international peace and security and to the success of United Nations activities in the latter sphere.

26. In not sharing the view that these two most important international problems -- disarmament and security -- should be tied together in a single package, we do not at all intend to minimize the role of efforts to strengthen international security. The Soviet Union has always attributed great significance to that problem. As is known, it was on the initiative of the Soviet Union that the item on the strengthening of international security was considered last year by the United Nations General Assembly. One of the main tasks of the twenty-fifth anniversary session of the General Assembly will be the elaboration of a concrete solution of that problem. There has also been wide support for the proposal of the socialist countries concerning the convening of a general European conference to work out measures to ensure security and the development of collaboration in Europe (ENDC/243).

27. We feel, however, that it is more appropriate, in practical terms, that questions of ensuring international security which are not an integral part of a programme of general and complete disarmament should be regarded as being in the category of general tasks of strengthening international peace and security, both at the world-wide and at the regional level. Attempts between the two world wars to make the solution of the above problems conditional on one another did not contribute to the achievement of progress in the matter of disarmament.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

28. Many delegations which have spoken during the present session of the Committee have referred to the relationship between general and complete disarmament and partial measures in this field. On that question the Soviet delegation bases itself on the provisions of the Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, paragraph 8 of which says that States participating in the negotiations should achieve agreement upon the total programme and that

"... efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme."

(ENDC/5)

29. Following that principle, we do not place partial measures of disarmament in opposition to general and complete disarmament. The Soviet delegation considers that the positive solution of partial disarmament measures creates favourable conditions for the elaboration of a programme, and the adoption of positive solutions, with regard to the problem of general and complete disarmament. On the other hand, success in the elaboration of a programme of general and complete disarmament would in turn contribute to the arrangement and implementation of partial measures. Thus the two problems -- partial measures and general and complete disarmament -- are closely interdependent; they condition one another and can be solved on parallel lines. That has already been borne out by the practice that has been followed in the solution of disarmament problems so far. Thus, in the past few years it has proved possible within the framework of the Committee to agree upon a number of Partial measures which are integral parts of the USSR proposal of 1962 concerning general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1). The fact that the difficulties we encounter in trying to harmonize the positions of parties on general and complete disarmament seem to us greater than those in harmonizing positions on partial measures, cannot be interpreted to mean that we should concentrate all our attention on partial measures at the expense of efforts to solve the question of general and complete disarmament.

30. In connexion with the problem of the relationship of the various aspects of disarmament, we should like to make a few comments also on the question of "equilibrium" in carrying out measures of disarmament, or the principle of balance, which has been referred to here by many delegations and in particular by the representative of Sweden.

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We share her view that "balance ... cannot mean scrapping gun for gun, or reducing armies soldier for soldier ..." (CCD/PV.478, para. 46) Today there are States which have nuclear and other powerful weapons, while most States do not possess such weapons. That means that the process of disarmament, by its very nature, cannot be purely mechanical in the sense indicated above.

31. This consideration was taken into account in the elaboration of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, paragraph 5 of which reads:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." (ENDC/5)

Such a definition of the principle of balance corresponds to the interests of all States. It was a basic element of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. For instance, the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States in the first stage were to be reduced to the level of 1,900,000 men, while for other States it was recommended that the level should be determined on the basis of the particular features and military capacity of the armed forces of the country in question.

32. In that provision, which relates to the principle of balance, there is a general approach: there is the idea of solving the problem as a whole, while the more detailed figures that flow from this principle for the armed forces of particular States are to be determined by the contracting parties when elaborating any given disarmament measure. This applies both to the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament and to the implementation of partial disarmament measures.

33. Speaking of the principle of balance in the process of disarmament we should like to recall the thesis we have advanced that in the implementation of important measures of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament and, especially, general and complete disarmament, all the militarily most significant States must participate, and absolutely all the nuclear Powers. The implementation of key disarmament measures by only some States would create a situation in which the security of the States carrying out the disarmament measures would be jeopardized. Such a course of events would in all likelihood lead to a deterioration of the international climate.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

34. Delegations in their statements have given considerable attention to the problem of verification of the implementation of disarmament agreements. Verification of disarmament constitutes an important and at the same time complex problem, inasmuch as its purpose is to ensure strict compliance by all parties to the treaty with their disarmament obligations. Disarmament is feasible only as a supervised process. There must be adequate guarantees that no States are evading the carrying out of disarmament measures and have no possibility of stockpiling armaments secretly, thereby creating a threat to the security of other States.

35. This is precisely the basis for one of the provisions in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations which says:

"All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations." (ibid., para. 6)

It is our conviction, however, that the implementation of control should not permit unjustified interference in the internal affairs of States. This control should ensure observation of the fulfilment of disarmament obligations but should not serve as a means for observation of, or spying upon, existing armaments and should not create a threat to the national security of States.

36. An international control system for the implementation of measures of general and complete disarmament was duly provided for in the 1962 Soviet draft treaty on the subject. In that draft the range of powers of the international control bodies is linked to the nature of the disarmament measures that are being carried out. For instance, for the reduction of the size of armed forces and of armaments on-site control is proposed at the places where the troops are disbanded and the armaments destroyed, and for the elimination of rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons on-site control would be carried out at the places where they are destroyed.

37. In the implementation of partial disarmament measures, too, it is necessary to take into account considerations of national security and not allow the verification of specific partial measures to over-expand into unjustified interference in the internal affairs of other States or into a means of military or political espionage.

38. We believe that in all cases where there is a readiness on the part of States to reach agreement on measures of disarmament, concrete forms and methods of verifying the implementation of such measures should and can be found although -- and we stress this -- elaborating and agreeing on forms and methods of control is a complex, involved process in which numerous political and military-technical factors play a part.

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Experience with disarmament shows that where there was a will to adopt appropriate political solutions, we found it possible to work out mutually acceptable positions on questions of verification.

39. The elaboration of a programme of disarmament will raise the question of priorities with regard to the various disarmament measures. Many delegations in this Committee have spoken in favour of giving priority to questions of nuclear disarmament. The Soviet delegation shares that view. As is known, immediately after the end of the Second World War the Soviet Union called for the immediate and unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons. Since then this question has been raised on numerous occasions by representatives of the Soviet Union in various international forums. Questions of nuclear disarmament are given pride of place in our draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, where it is proposed in the very first stage to eliminate simultaneously all means of delivering nuclear weapons -- strategic, operational and tactical.

40. In the Soviet Government's Memorandum of 1 July 1968 on Some Urgent Measures for Stopping the Arms Race and for Disarmament (ENDC/227) it was proposed that negotiations should be started forthwith on stopping the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the reduction of stockpiles of those weapons and the subsequent total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons under appropriate international control.

41. In addition, we would point out that so far as the actual content of a disarmament programme is concerned, the bases for such a programme have already, as we see it, been delineated in documents available to members of the Committee: the Soviet draft Treaty of 1962 on General and Complete Disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1), the Soviet Government's Memorandum of 1968 on Some Urgent Measures for Stopping the Arms Race and for Disarmament (ENDC/227), the provisional agenda of the Committee adopted by the Committee in 1968 (ENDC/236, p. 3), and other documents. These documents contain proposals on questions relating both to the limitation and elimination of armaments and to general and complete disarmament. They deal also with problems of nuclear disarmament, the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces, the freezing and reduction of military budgets, and all other measures leading to the dismantling of the military apparatus and the disbanding of all armed forces. Finally, these documents also envisage the implementation of partial or collateral disarmament measures.

42. We realize that the solution of the problem of priorities in the matter of disarmament presents numerous complications, inasmuch as the problem is closely connected with that of ensuring the security of States. The determination and approval

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of priorities in the disarmament programme call for considerable efforts, which can yield positive results only if there is goodwill and a readiness on the part of States to find agreement on measures for general and complete disarmament.

43. Those are some of our views on the problems that have been put forward by delegations during consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament. The extensive discussion which has taken place in the Committee on this question will doubtless contribute to progress in the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. We believe that on the basis of the discussion that has taken place and in the light of the views that have been expressed and the proposals that have been made, it will be possible to determine our future procedure for agreeing on the programme, and subsequent implementation, of measures for general and complete disarmament.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 486th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of

H.E. Ambassador Milous Vejvoda, representative of Czechoslovakia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Canada, Yugoslavia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"The following documents were circulated. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: working paper on the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons (CCD/303); Italy: additional working paper on the problems of controls over chemical weapons (CCD/304); letter dated 5 August 1970 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting General Assembly document A/7967/Add.4 (CCD/284/Add.3); Canada: working paper on seismological capabilities in detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions (CCD/305).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 13 August 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.